Abstract:
In 1836, the state of Indiana set out to build a Mammoth system of canals, railroads, and turnpikes following a decade of intense debate in which sectional rivalries prevented any state action. This paper investigates the role played by the adoption of an ad valorem property tax in ameliorating the sectional rivalries and coordinating the costs of financing the transportation system with the taxes levied to finance it. It also traces the rise and fall of land values in the state between 1835 and 1842, estimating the effect of internal improvement projects on land values.
At the end of the War of 1812, America possessed a seemingly inexhaustible amount of land available for settlement in the west. The land's full potential could only be realized by building a transportation network linking the fertile Ohio and Mississippi valleys with the rapidly developing economies of the eastern seaboard. Sectional rivalries repeatedly frustrated federal government efforts to build a national system of "internal improvements."
1 With few exceptions, Congress was unable to forge an agreement between sections of the country on where improvements should go and how they would be paid for. 2 Crossing the Appalachian barrier was left to the states. New York's bold and enterprising construction of the Erie Canal, begun in 1817, inaugurated the state canal era, followed by Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Maryland in the 1820s. Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan began work on canals and railroads in the mid 1830s, even as New York and Ohio expanded their canal systems and Massachusetts and Georgia were working on railroads.
It might appear that states, with their smaller land areas and relatively more homogenous populations, were able to avoid the geographic conflicts that plagued the national government.
Such was not the case. Americans struggled to implement a vision of democracy in which the government played a positive role in promoting economic development, at the same time that the government did not unduly burden one group to benefit another. Canals were, by nature, geographically specific enterprises. Construction of a canal unavoidably privileged some geographic areas while creating potential or actual tax liabilities for everyone else. One apparent solution was to build canals (or railroads) everywhere at once, a solution often credited for overburdening transportation systems in Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Illinois. Logrolling, however, was only an apparent solution. States could not build canals to every county. Some way had to be found to reconcile and coordinate the disparate interest of taxpayers and the promoters and supporters of internal improvements.
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Conditions were unique in every state, but in the central tier of states through which the major east/west transportation routes ultimately ran -New York, Ohio, and Indiana -states reconciled geographic competition over canals in the same way. Each state altered their existing property taxes to more carefully bring the costs of financing internal improvements into line with the geographic distribution of benefits. The essential element in the new tax systems was tying the benefits of canal construction realized in higher land prices to the taxes that individual citizens paid. In New York, in 1817, the state created a special "canal tax" to be levied on counties on the canal if it became necessary to raise additional funds to service state bonds. In
Ohio in 1826 and Indiana in 1836, new ad valorem property taxes on land and other personal property were created to shift the burden of state taxation from agricultural land assessed on a per acre basis to a more equitable base of farm lands, town lands, and personal property.
Miller's Enterprise of a Free People and Scheiber's Ohio Canal Era show how important tax changes were in New York and Ohio. Indiana's story has yet to be told.
In 1830, much of Indiana was wilderness: Indians still held claim to the north west quarter of the state. Except for long settled southern counties along the Ohio river, a natural highway to the Mississippi and eastern markets, Hoosiers were far removed from the transportation necessary to bring their agricultural goods to market. Without better transportation, Indiana land was worth little more than the $1.25 an acre it brought at public auction, a lack acutely appreciated by the farming land speculators that made up the electorate.
After a decade of debate, in 1836 the Indiana legislature enacted a new ad valorem property tax and authorized the commissioners of the state's Board of Internal Improvement to borrow up to $10 million dollars, at an interest rate of no higher than 5 percent, to survey and construct a network of canals, roads, and railroads spanning the state. 4 At the time, Indiana had a population of 600,000 people and annual tax revenues of about $50,000. Financial difficulties forced the state to suspend construction on canals and railroads in 1839. By 1841, the state was in default on over $12,000,000 in state debts, none of the canals or railroads were completed, and Indiana and the nation were in the grip of the deepest depression of the 19 th century.
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The major obstacle to internal improvements in Indiana before 1836 was sectional, just as it was in the nation. 6 A closer look at the historical record illuminates how the shift to ad valorem taxation placated section rivalries, made the enactment of the "Mammoth" system of internal improvements possible, and reveals a hidden treasure. Not leaving the geographic distribution of taxes to chance, in 1835 Indiana commissioned the state Auditor to prepare a report detailing how the proposed ad valorem property tax would effect each county in the state.
That report forms the basis for a statistical inquiry into the effects the ad valorem tax on the incidence of the property tax and, subsequently, the effect of internal improvement construction on land values throughout Indiana. The majority of Indiana counties expected to pay a lower share of state taxes under the ad valorem system than under the old per acre land tax. Towns, with their urban land and larger holdings of personal property, bore significantly higher tax burdens under the ad valorem system. It was, of course, those very same towns that expected to gain the lion's share of gains from the construction of canals and railroads. By switching to the ad valorem tax, canal proponents agreed to shoulder a larger share of the future taxes necessary to finance the transportation system. The early years of the 1830s brought renewed prosperity to Indiana and the entire western region of the country. Table 1 provides some basic information for the years 1834 to 1843: national land sales in thousands of acres, public land sales in Indiana in thousands of acres, acres of land subject to taxation, the value of land and improvements, the value of town lots, average per acre value of land including and excluding town lots, and total tax revenues from all source collected in each fiscal year. The table shows the peak of land sales in 1836, the peak of land values in 1837, and the rapid decline in land values after 1839. 10 Note one unusual feature of Few Indiana historians understand how passage of the Mammoth bill was connected to changes in the structure of property taxation. Most historians ignore the new tax system altogether. 16 The change to ad valorem property tax changes is usually dated 1835, while the Mammoth bill is always dated 1836, implying the two changes occurred at least a year apart. In the 1850s, Indiana politicians blamed the collapse of the internal improvement system on the fact that projects had been started in so many parts of the state in order to placate sectional rivalries.
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Esarey's account of the passage of the Mammoth bill draws heavily on the recollection of politicians at the constitutional convention of 1850, particularly a speech given by Judge Kilgore.
Kilgore's story emphasized the importance of logrolling and the sentiment, expressed in a speech by Owen, that "if we must be taxed for the support of this system, let us, at least, have a share in its benefits." 18 It was forgotten that changes to the property tax were as important in working out the regional compromise as starting projects all over the state. Indeed, legislators required that the compromise over taxation be made explicit before the Mammoth bill could go forward, the central claim of this paper.
Prior to 1835, Indiana relied on two revenue sources: a poll tax and a land tax. Land was classified into one of three categories --first, second, and third rate --and taxed by the acre. The rates in force since 1831 levied a tax of "eighty cents on each hundred acres of first-rate land, sixty cents on each hundred acres of second-rate land, and forty cents on each hundred acre of third-rate land." 19 Polls, "each male inhabitant between twenty-one and sixty years of age, who is sane and not a pauper," were taxed at thirty-seven and a half cents per person. In fiscal 1834, the state levied $28,362 in poll taxes and $25,807 in land taxes. As Indiana legislators contemplated an internal improvement system in the winters of 1833/34, 1834/35, and 1835/36 they also considered an ad valorem property tax.
The proponents and opponents of the internal improvement system were divided and six of these were on the Ohio. The total voting strength of these counties was always less than ten out of a body of eighty members."
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The internal improvement counties (counties through which a proposed canal, railroad, or turnpike would pass) clearly possessed a majority of the votes in the Senate and House as early as 1833, why didn't a canal bill pass sooner? First, despite the claim by some canal promoters that property taxes would not have to be raised to cover interest payments, many voters and legislators had serious doubts that taxes would stay low. In fact, the Canal commissioners report in 1836
assumed that property tax rates would rise from ½ mill to 1 mill. The original ½ mill rate was raised to 1 mill in 1837, then in successive steps to 4 mills in 1842. Fears about higher taxes were legitimate and warranted. Actual property tax collections as a millage of property valuations are given in Table 2 .
More importantly, it was generally believed that the proposed changes in the property tax would have a significant impact on the geographic allocation of taxation. Land owners in older, southern agricultural regions were sure that taxing land by value would disproportionately raise their tax burden. Richard Thompson, a representative from Bedford in Lawrence county, who was an enthusiastic supporter of internal improvements, was nonetheless concerned about how taxes might be raised to finance it. As he wrote to Governor Noble in June of 1835, he was adamantly opposed to ad valorem taxation:
Our people are opposed -most violently opposed to the ad valorem system of taxation, at this time. They think, that the time as not yet come -that the burthen of taxation will be unequally increased upon the farmer of the old counties. This has always been my opinion. The advocates of that system, I think are mistaken when they assert that the system is equalized by bringing in to the treasury a tax from the north, which we now loose [sic] . It must be admitted that the farmer of the north, (however unimproved his farm may be if it be in cultivation at all) must have such articles of personal property as are taxable under the present law -that the farmer of the S. has accumulated a much larger portion of personal property than in the new counties. Under this state of things the aggregate increase will be such as to render it unequal & oppressive upon the farmer of the old counties, because he pays a tax for those things which the farmer of the new counties has not, and which he must have hereafter. Until the property is equalized & all the land of the state taxable, I think it bad policy -... (Thompson to Noble, June 5, 1835, in Riker and Thornbrough, 1958, pp.372 ).
Thompson's letter shows that a canal supporter could still oppose the system if it entailed a switch to ad valorem taxation. It also shows the logic of the southern farmers case against ad valorem taxes: southern farmers possessed more wealth subject to the tax than northern farmers in new counties.
This logic is distinctly different from the logic that Governor Noble, the most important supporter of the internal improvement system, laid out in his Governor's messages in December of 1833, 1834, and 1835. All three messages urged a switch to ad valorem taxation and beginning a system of internal improvements. The message of December 3, 1833 called assessment under the current revenue system "defective, unequal, and unnecessarily expensive."
The message of December 2, 1834 recommended that Indiana consider changing its "revenue laws to insure greater accuracy and uniformity, as well as economy, in assessing and rating lands for taxation." In his message of December 8, 1835 Noble was more explicit: "The expenses of our state government have been hitherto, borne, principally, by the landholders, while other large, and generally, much more productive investments of capital have contributed little or nothing to the state treasury. Although some of our citizens object to the number of articles included in the law, it is confidently believed, it can be so shaped as to render it agreeable to their viewsparticularly when they see that the tax upon land will be reduced in proportion to the amount that is charged upon other subjects of taxation -such property as now pays nothing and which can only be brought in by the change proposed. No good and satisfactory reason can be assigned why capital invested in town property, bank stock, merchandize, or money at interest, should not be subject to the same rate of taxation as an equal amount invested in land."
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What Noble understood and Thompson did not, was all farmers could realize lower taxes if a shift to ad valorem taxation occurred. The major shift in the incidence of taxation was not between northern and southern farmers in the new and old counties, but between residents of the towns and the farmers. The way to resolve the disagreement about the actual incidence of ad valorem taxation was to actually assess property values. This was done in the act to "provide for an equitable mode of levying the taxes of this state," approved on February 7, 1835. The act charged the Auditor of the state and the clerks of each county with appointing assessors to "take a list of all the taxable inhabitants of his township, and make an assessment of all the property therein made subject to taxation by this act, and for that purpose he shall call on each person resident in his township, and request of such person a list of all his property liable to taxation as aforesaid in said township;..." 22 The Auditor was to report his findings to the Governor and legislature in December of 1835. The act, however, did not levy any taxes. 23 It mandated that information be collected on the value of land and personal property in order to make an informed decision about changing the revenue law. Every taxable inhabitant heard about the proposed law, as they were each to be visited by the assessor in their township.
The 1835 revenue law was intimately connected to the internal improvement bill considered at the same session. The Indiana Journal, January 5, 1835, reported on an amendment proposed by Mr. Clark to the internal improvement bill then under consideration. The amendment would have put off construction on any projects until further study was made and:
"Also to inquire if it not be necessary that an ad valorem system of taxation be adopted by the state before entering upon any system of internal improvement, and providing that lands in the vicinity of the contemplated works shall be rated with a reference to the increased value they will acquire, and thereby make the burthen of constructing works of improvement bear a proportion corresponding with the benefits received." Although Clark's amendment was rejected, the legislature ultimately enacted the amendment's substance in the revenue bill of February 7, 1835, which required the Auditor to prepare a report on the effects of an ad valorem tax, and in the internal improvement bill passed on February 6, 1835, which required the commissioners of the canal fund to prepare a report on the canal and railroad projects authorized a year later in the The law of last session, providing for a change in our revenue system, does not require the clerks of the several counties to report the returns of the assessors to the Auditor of State before the first day of December, consequently I am not able to present you with a view of the result of the valuations. From the best information I can obtain, however, it is believed that the disparity anticipated in the value of real estate in the old and new districts of the state, does not exist. If, upon a comparison of all the returns, this opinion shall found to be correct, there can be but little reason to question the policy or justice of a change.
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The assessors reports were ultimately filed and we can compare the returns of the State
Auditor for 1834 and 1835 to ascertain the amount of property tax paid by each county under both forms of taxation. The results were surprising (they are reported by county in appendix Table   A1 ). In both years the state expected to receive roughly $25,000 from the property tax on land, so we can compare directly the amount of tax paid by each county. Of the 55 counties for which complete information is available in both years, 39 paid less tax under the ad valorem scheme than the old system. 26 Ad valorem taxes were less than 80 percent of per acre taxes in 28 counties, while in only 12 counties were ad valorem taxes more than 120 percent of per acre taxes. The figures in the table and in the analysis, focus on the value of land and improvements, excluding town lots and personal property.
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As already noted, Noble understood why so many counties paid lower taxes: the inclusion of taxes on town property, bank stock, merchandise or money at interest. The numerical majority of land owners in Indiana were farmers and the per acre tax fell largely on their land. Ad valorem taxation enabled to the state to tax the value of town lands and other personal property, and shift some of the tax burden away from agricultural land. Agricultural land in the older southern counties did not experience higher taxes as a result of the shift to ad valorem taxation (see below) and southern opposition to the canal bill was substantially muted as a result. Indiana was not a heavily urbanized state in 1835, and the small number of town residents bore a larger share of the tax burden under the new tax system. The adoption of the ad valorem tax, however, was not the result of tyranny of the majority, other forces were also at work.
Indiana towns were located at breaks in the transportation network. When the state planned the system of internal improvements, it chose routes that followed existing rivers (a necessity for canals) and ran between existing population centers. To do otherwise made no sense. Although farmers along canal and railroad routes expected to benefit from lower transportation costs, the big winners from internal improvements, and therefore the most vocal promoters, were the mercantile interests in the towns located in the interstices of the system.
Appendix Table A1 also includes the share of all land value in the county in town lots in 1835, and a variable "terminus" indicating whether two or more transportation lines (actual or proposed) intersected within the county. The table is sorted by the ratio of taxes paid under the ad valorem tax to taxes paid under the per acre tax. Counties whose taxes rose under the ad valorem system were much more likely to have a high share of town property in their total assessed land value, and they were more likely to be terminus counties. Table 3 presents the results of bivariate regressions where the dependent variable is the ratio of ad valorem taxes proposed in 1835 to per acre taxes levied in 1834. The tax ratio is regressed on a dummy variable for "internal improvement" counties (all counties including a canal, railroad, or turnpike proposed in the Mammoth bill), a dummy for "terminus" counties (all counties including an intersection of two transportation routes, including the Ohio River), "town lands" (the value of town lands as a share of total land value in each county), and "latitude" (the latitude of the central point of each county).
The results clearly indicate counties that ultimately received a canal or railroad paid higher taxes. On average, ad valorem taxes in internal improvement counties were 33 percent higher than in non-internal improvement counties. 28 Terminus counties, including all of Indiana's larger towns, paid ad valorem taxes that were 73 percent higher than non-terminus counties. This result is confirmed by the estimates for town lots. A one percentage point increase in the share of town land in the total land value in a county of increased that county's ad valorem taxes by 2.5 percentage points. Finally, the estimates for latitude address directly the concerns of southern counties, who felt they would pay higher taxes under the ad valorem scheme. Instead, northern counties paid slightly higher ad valorem taxes than southern counties relative to the per acre tax.
The regression estimates only emphasize what the eye sees in the raw data. The dozen counties that paid substantially higher ad valorem taxes were the primary beneficiaries of internal improvement investment (a point substantiated in the next section). Had the shift in revenue structure not been tied to the internal improvement program, the towns would have adamantly opposed the change. Towns stood to gain the most from canals and railroads, and they were quite willing to exchange higher taxes for the benefits they saw just over the horizon. The upper panel of Table 5 reports the results of bivariate regressions that duplicate the differences-in-differences results for internal improvement and terminus counties, and conveniently provide standard errors for the difference estimates. (Table 6 An appreciation of the ingenious ways in which American governments pursued the sometimes conflicting goals of promoting economic development while nurturing democratic political institutions is the focus of this paper. Indiana wanted canals and railroads for very good economic reasons. The typical citizen was a land speculator, if only in a small way, and the median voter certainly wanted to raise land values by building transportation improvements.
Inevitably, however, building a canal rewarded some groups at the expense of others, an outcome inconsistent with beliefs about the fairness of democratic outcomes. Indiana struggled for a decade to find a compromise between sectional interests that would enable it to go forward with a system of transportation improvements. Ultimately, the compromise was not to build canals and railroads to every county. If that had been the only constraint the Indiana legislature could have property tax coordinated the benefits of canal construction with the taxes levied to finance canal costs, enabling opponents and supporters of Indiana's Mammoth system to reach a political compromise and launch Indiana's ill-fated era of internal improvements.
1.As Larson, 2001 and 1987 , and Goodrich, 1960 and 1948 , explain, the federal government was unable to support a national system of canals and/or railroads before the Civil War because of concerns over national power and sectional rivalries. Larson and Goodrich are excellent histories of the internal improvement movement in the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s, and provide a background for the Indiana experience studied in this paper.
2.What might seem to be the major exception, Congress's passage of the Bonus Bill in 1817 allocating the bonus paid by the Second Bank of the United States to a fund to support internal improvements, is the exception that proves the rule. The Bonus Bill did not specify any projects, indeed it could not have passed had it done so. Calhoun, the bill's sponsor, admitted a bill specifying projects in detail could not be passed: "The enemies to any possible system in detail and those who are opposed in principle, would unite and defeat it." Annals of Congress, 14 th Congress, 2 nd session, p. 852-58 (As quoted in Larson, 2001, p. 66) . Instead, the Bonus Bill allocated money between the states on the basis of population, insuring that no major projects would be built in any state(s). See Larson's discussion of the Bonus Bill, pp. 64-67.
3."Internal improvements" encompasses transportation improvements of all types. Railroads were just coming on the scene in the late 1820s and early 1830s. From the standpoint of state investment, canals and railroads were very close substitutes. "Canals" are often used in the text where "canals and railroads" would be equally appropriate.
4."An Act to provide for a general system of Internal Improvements." Indiana Laws, Chapter II, Indiana General Assembly, 20 th session, p. 5. The history of the Indiana canals is told in Fatout 1972 , Carmony 1998 , and Esarey 1912 and 1918 5.The best source on history of state borrowing and the debt crisis is McGrane 1935. Ratchford 1941 provides additional information. For more recent studies of the debt crisis see English 1996 , Sylla and Wallis 1998 , and Wallis, Grinath, and Sylla 1997 .Peculiarities in the history and administration of the property tax in New York and Ohio make it impossible to duplicate this analysis in those states. For more than a decade from the 1820s to the 1830s New York suspended its state property tax entirely, and the state stopped collecting information on assessed values and property taxes in the counties. Ohio was notorious for not reassessing land values. Once entered on the books property values would remain unchanged for years, rendering problematic variations in land values over short periods of time.
7.For the geography of Indiana counties see Pence and Armstrong, 1933 . I have also relied on the maps in Esarey, 1918. 8. The 29 percent figure is taken from the enumeration of "polls" in the Indiana Auditor's Report for 1834. Endnotes 9. Larson, 2001 , p. 207. See Fatout, 1972 , for a description of events leading up to the grant for the Wabash & Erie.
10.We do not have the numbers for 1839. The Auditor reported in 1841 that per acre values in Indiana were $7.30 in 1838, $8.80 in 1839, $7.05 in 1840, and $6.18 in 1841. These numbers are not exactly the same as the actual numbers presented in earlier Auditor's Reports, but they are consistent. The Auditor felt that 1839 was the peak year for land values in Indiana.
11.More land was sold in 1836 than in any other year in the nation's history. The reasons for the land boom have never been satisfactorily explained, booms rarely are completely understandable, and there has been considerable disagreement about the causes of the Panic of 1837 that checked the land boom. See Temin, 1969. Temin 12.Noble would head the Internal Improvement Board when his second term as Governor ended in 1837. The Indiana Democrat, July 19, 1837 chastised Noble and governor elect Wallace: "When the subject of internal improvements was first agitated by Ex. Governor Ray; Gov. Noble and Wallace were opposed to it. Ray was regarded as a visionary schemer, the advantages of internal improvements were underrated; and the resources of the state were not duly estimated. It was good policy, no doubt then, on the part of Noble and Wallace, to oppose internal improvements, and the Gov. then rode the anti internal improvements hob by, with whip and spur, with as much speed as he now rides the internal improvement hobby." 13. Riker and Thornbrough, 1958, p. 204-5. 14.As quoted in Carmony, 1992, p. 191. 15.Robertson and Riker, 1942, p. 127 . "Assemblymen wrestled with a multitude of proposals, making the usual vote-swapping bargains with each other, but they could not agree on the details of a general system satisfactory to all the clamorous sections of the state. " Fatout, 1972, p. 67. 16. The only explicit recognition of the link between the tax bill and the internal improvement bill comes in Riker and Thornbrough, 1958, p. 316 and Carmony, 1998, p. 158 , but the nature of the connection is not explained or understood.
The Indiana historians include Esarey (1912 and 1918 ), Fatout 1972 , Carmony 1998 , Duden 1090 , Miller 1907 , Riker and Thornbrough 1958 , Benton 1907 , Chambers 1907 , and Comstock 1911 . The most thorough treatment of internal improvements in Indiana is Esarey's Internal Improvements in Early Indiana (1912) , which is repeated, almost verbatim, in his History of Indiana (1918) . Esarey makes no mention of the tax bills in connection with the internal improvement bills.
The irresistible tendency is to suggest that Indiana made no provision for taxation at all when it started the Mammoth system. For example, "Numerous politicians and voters alike persuaded themselves that a system of internal improvements could be financed through long term loans paid for largely, if not entirely, by revenue generated by the resulting, canals, railroads, and turnpikes. " Carmony, 1998, p. 185. Or "The plan that emerged was a splendid free gift offered to the public with emphatic assurances that it would not cost anybody one cent of additional taxes " Fatout, 1972, p. 73. Carmony and Fatout accurately reflect the general feeling that the Mammoth system would not result in higher taxes, while ignoring the explicit arrangement that legislators had made about the distribution of taxes should higher taxes be necessary. As soon as 1837 it was necessary to raise the tax rate from .5 mill to 1 mill. Tax rates would eventually rise to 4 mills in 1841 in an attempt to stave off default.
17.Esarey's 1912 essay concludes with a sweeping indictment of Indiana politics in 1835 and 1836, taken from the words of Indiana politicians at the constitutional convention in 1850.
18.Kilgore's speech on the afternoon of Thursday, November 21, 1850 can be found in Indiana Constitutional Convention (1851) 20. Both quotes are from Esarey, 1912 , p. 98 or 1918 , p. 410. 21.Riker and Thornbrough, 1958 , the 1833 message is on pp. 191-210, the quote from p. 192; the 1834 message is on pp. 314-333, and the quote on p. 315; and the 1835 message is on pp. 385-412, and the quote from p. 407. Indiana, Chapter XI, 19 th session, p. 14.
Laws of
23.Section 30 of the act can be read as implying that the ad valorem tax would be implemented on February 1, 1836, but the legislature would explicitly authorize implementation of the tax in the winter of 1836. As discussed by State Senator Embree, the design of the act was explicitly designed to allow for public opposition, by "allowing it [the new tax] to take effect one year after its passage so that if the people should not be satisfied with its provisions they could easily instruct their representatives before it went into operation -this at least will bring the subject before the people and I hope will be the means of settling the question so that so much time and money will not hereafter by annually spent legislating on it." From the Embree papers in the Indiana State Library, quoted by Riker and Thornbrough, 1958, pp. 315-16. 24 .As quoted in Carmony, 1998, p. 158 ; also referenced in Riker and Thornbrough, 1958, p. 316. 25.Riker and Thornbrough, 1958, p. 407. 26 .Fifteen new counties were created in 1835, and these are not included in the comparison. Neither are the seven counties created between 1836 and 1844. Of the existing counties in existence in 1834, fifteen reported incomplete information in 1834 or 1835.
27.It seems natural to include the value of town lots in the value of land, but a problem arises when we compare per acre valuations across counties. In most Indiana counties, the value of town lots per acre of land fell in the late 1830s as the amount of land subject to taxation rose.
This has nothing to do with the actual value of the town lots, it is a result driven by acreage.
Since the results in the paper would only be stronger if town lots were included, I have chosen to leave them out.
28.Since the comparison between the per acre tax and the ad valorem tax both compare $25,000 in total taxes, the mean ratio of taxes under the two systems is very close to 1. Evaluating the coefficients at the mean tax ratio of 1 produces the percentage changes in taxes reported in this paragraph.
29. See Fatout, 1972, pp. 96-106 . The default crisis is considered in much greater detail, including the situation in Indiana in Wallis, Grinath, and Sylla 1997/2003 and the particular importance of the Morris defaults in 1839 for Indiana and the nation as a whole in Wallis, 2001 . For the purposes of this paper, it is enough to note that the Morris default was completely exogenous to Indiana (most of the Morris bonds went directly to Europe) and that the state was taken by surprise in the summer of 1839.
30.This is the mean increase in land values per acre across counties, that is, it is the average of the county values. The numbers in Table 1 show that the average acre of land rose from $5.41 per acre in 1835 to $9.87 in 1837. These numbers are the average value for all acres, that is, total value of land in the state divided by total acreage. Because land values are not distributed equally over all counties, the two "averages" are slightly different.
31. Ultimately the Wabash and Erie, and the Whitewater canal were completed, but not until later in the 1840s. In effect, even the estimates comparing 1837 and 1842 underestimate the effect of canals, since people knew that there were plans in the works to complete those two canals. The lower portion of the Whitewater canal had been completed in 1839. Later we will see that land values along the Whitewater rose between 1837 and 1842.
32.This is the subject for another paper, with more careful consideration of the effect of different types of transportation projects on land values, using more thorough data, as done by Craig, Palmquist, and Weiss, 1998. 33.If counties with higher taxes under the ad valorem system are compared to counties with lower taxes, i.e. using a break point of one, the difference estimate is small and statistically insignificant. There are a number of counties clustered around a ratio of one. A regression of the change in land values between 1835 and 1837 on the tax ratio is provided in table 4. A rise in the tax ratio of .01 increases land values by about $.02 an acre.
34.For a brief history of the Whitewater Canal see Miller, 1907 . Portions of the Whitewater Canal are still in operation today, and remnants of the canal are visible for most of its length. Notes: Acres in thousands of acres, value in thousands of dollars, and value per acre in dollars. Land Sales from Gates. All other information from Annual Report of the Auditor of State, Indiana, various years. These numbers are taken from the totals reported by the State Auditor, they differ in minor respects from other totals reported in the paper which represent the sum of the county figures reported by the Auditor. Total Taxes includes all revenues collected in each fiscal year. Note: The effective tax rate is calculated by taking the ratio of taxes paid to the total value of assessed property. The effective rate includes the effects of delinquencies and defaults. The legislated rate was usually the next highest half number, e.g. ½ mill, 1 mill Notes: Dependent variable in all regressions "Ratio of Taxes in 1835/1834," a continuous variable measuring the ratio of ad valorem taxes levied in 1835 to the per acre taxes levied in 1834.
All observations are county means or dummy variables.
"Internal Improvement" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a county has a canal, railroad, or turnpike.
"Terminus" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a county contains an intersection of a canal, railroad, turnpike, and/or river.
"Town Lands" is a continuous variable measuring the share of town lands in total value of all lands in 1835.
"Latitude" is the latitude of the center point of each county. Notes:
Average land values per acre are calculated for land and improvements. They do no include town lots or personal property.
The number of observations in each cell varies. All differences are statistically significant at the 10 percent level or higher. Intercept not reported because of space limitations.
"Ratio of Taxes in 1835/1834 is a continuous variable measuring the ratio of ad valorem taxes levied in 1835 to the per acre taxes levied in 1834.
The remaining variables are dummies for the counties that border on or contain the Wabash and Erie Canal, the Ohio River, the Central Canal, a turnpike, the Whitewater Canal, the Fort Wayne and Michigan Canal, ora railroad. 
